(Kabul; 10-03; p.2)
This mission is not an entirely new one but an
extension of an old mandate onto this region. It is in accordance
with resolutions of the UN security council and limited to a year
(you will find the relevant documents of the German parliament
for this mission in Bundestagsdrucksache 15/1700
and 15/1806).
Arguments for decisions
More interesting than the mission itself is its
underlying rationality, i.e. the criteria for decision-finding.
Before 1998 this question did not come up, because West- and later
all Germany neither could nor should project military power out
of the state’s area. – It might be useful to remember in this
respect that the FRG and the GDR became members of the United
Nations not before 1973.
If at all or to what extent German politicians
in fact could decide freely on the deployment of soldiers during
the war of the NATO-states against Yugoslavia in 1998 has to be
found out by further research.
– Provided, the decision was based on the attitude "make
peace – if necessary with weapons", this has been revealed
in the face of latest incidents in Iraq as an idealistic-technocratic
delusion.
So, it becomes clear that the world after the Cold War is neither
pacifyable nor governable. To establish peaceful conditions, lies
therefore within the respective responsibility of state and societal
actors.
Because of that, the German government’s stance
is to be welcomed to use military power at most as ultima ratio
to suppress resolving conflicts by violent means. – This stance
is formulated in the government’s guide-lines for defence policy,
the "Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien".
Exactly this also the general direction of the Bundeswehr’s mission
in Afghanistan and in addition, the government does spend money
on the civil reconstruction of the country. – Military activities
therefore remain embedded in a civil concept. (read
on here)